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Abstract—This paper investigates the coordination of multiple
autonomous High Altitude Platform Stations (HAPS) in a vol-
canic cloud emergency scenario for aerial communications cover-
age. Deploying unmanned(pilot-less) HAPS over areas impacted
by volcanic ash clouds is proposed in this work. Volcanic ash
clouds stretching over distances can be challenging and requires
resilient wireless communications infrastructure. In this work a
self-organising solar-powered HAPS network is presented and
its resilience tested in the event of the failure of a participating
HAPS in the swarm. The future of implementing swarm of un-
manned HAPS for communications services requires autonomous
capabilities as demonstrated in this paper. A swarm intelligence
based algorithm developed for this work is applied to coordinate
a swarm of HAPS for communications coverage. The paper
highlights the demands of such self-organising infrastructure and
how failure may impact communications coverage, especially in
emergency scenarios where high availability and reliability of
the supporting communications infrastructure is critical.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview of Volcanic Incidence Environment
Volcanic eruptions are natural phenomena that can have
devastating impact on humans, animals and the environment
[1], [2]. There are about 575 historically active terrestrial
volcanoes, and an annual eruption of about 12 volcanoes
affecting “cruise altitude” airspace [1]. Such eruptions can
produce enormous ash clouds injecting substantial amounts of
gas, aerosol and ash into the troposphere, and even up to the
stratosphere in some cases [1]. The impact of the resulting
volcanic plumes, volcanic clouds, and associated climatic
effects will vary depending on the mass of the eruption, and
local atmospheric factors. It may also result in the volcanic
cloud spreading over thousands of kilometers, constituting
grave danger to aviation traffic by reducing visibility and
increasing risk of engine failure [1], [3]. For instance, the
2010 Eyjafjallajokull eruption in Iceland (see figure 1), re-
sulted in the largest air traffic shutdown in recent times [1],
demonstrating the devastating impact of volcanic incidences.
In other instances, airplanes have had direct encounter with
volcanic ash with severe consequences e.g. 1982 Galunggung
volcano incident in Indonesia resulted in significant engine
damage to 2 Boeing 747s [4]. Due to its critical nature, the
aviation industry maintains records on volcanic ash incidences
and has a formal severity index to categorise encounters [5].
However, the monitoring and proactive response to volcanic
incidences rely heavily on satellite observation and effective
communications [6], [7]. The use of Geo-Stationary satellites
for earth monitoring and observation is covered in literature
[7]; the use of satellites for earth observation will remain
relevant, especially with improvements in infrared spectral
imaging [1]. There has also been proposals to use Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) to support volcanic research through
collection of in-situ data and related activities within these
hazardous and extreme environments [8], though not for
emergency response which this work considers.
This work, however, focuses on providing HAPS based com-
munications coverage in the event of a volcanic emergency,
where terrestrial or satellite infrastructure is degraded or non-
existent. The need for resilient aerial communications infras-
tructure to support volcanic emergencies, which are typical ex-
treme environments are needed. In this work, self-organising
High Altitude Platform Stations (HAPS) are proposed as an
optional and less expensive infrastructure to provide area
communications and sensor coverage over the affected region.
Fig. 1. Volcanic Ash from the 2010 Eyjafjallajokull eruption in Iceland [9].
B. HAPS as an Aerial Communications Infrastructure
High Altitude Platforms (HAPS) are aerial vehicles that oper-
ate in stratospheric altitudes ranging from 17 to 50Km above
mean sea level [10]. At this altitude wind profile is described
as mild and suitable for hosting platforms with minimal station
keeping requirements. These platforms can be implemented as
heavier than air (HTA) platforms e.g. fixed-wing aircraft. The
use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a communication
infrastructure is covered in literature and continues to be con-
sidered an active area of research [11]–[15]. However, HAPS
are actually distinct from low altitude platforms (LAPS)
UAVs [16], which typically operate within the troposphere,
with lower endurance capabilities and footprints. HAPS by
design operate from the stratosphere and is considered a
platform for providing persistent communications coverage
to mobile and fixed users, with inherent technical strengths
of terrestrial and satellite communications systems combined
[17]–[19]. HAPS offer large footprints with signal latency
similar to terrestrial systems. Furthermore, they can be easily
recovered and redeployed to meet changes in demand, a new
capability that neither satellite nor terrestrial systems can offer
effectively. This is particularly relevant in this case as volcanic
ash can spread over thousands of kilometers [1], and will
require larger footprints to cover. Furthermore, due to non-
ingestion of air as electric vehicles they are less vulnerable
to the effects of volcanic particulates. HAPS potential for
multi-day persistence and its low cost and risk (for the pilot-
less option) makes it a good technology option for volcanic
emergency coverage. A typical HAPS platform is the Airbus
Zephyr (see figure 2), a solar aircraft with the world endurance
record for flying 25 days continuously without refueling. This
work will investigate how multiple solar-powered HAPS can
be autonomously coordinated to provide coverage and how the
swarm will react to failure (e.g. of a platform) in a volcanic
cloud environment.
Fig. 2. Airbus Zephyr - Typical HAPS Platform [20]
In this paper, section I gives an overview of volcanic envi-
ronments and HAPS communications infrastructure. Section
II, describes the problem scenario, modeling and simulation
methodology for the work. In section III, simulation results
and analysis are presented. Finally, section IV draws conclu-
sions on the work and considers future work.
II. PROBLEM SCENARIO, MODELING AND SIMULATION
BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Problem Scenario
The scenario simulated is a swarm of four HAPS providing
area coverage over a region devastated by volcanic activity
and with volcanic ash spreading over hundreds of kilometres
beyond the eruption area. The HAPS swarm also includes a
“cold standby” spare platform which is activated in the event
of the failure of any active HAPS in the network, see figure
3. It is expected that due to the extreme nature of the environ-
ment, a HAPS platform may fail and require replacement. The
swarm of HAPS are autonomously coordinated and should be
able to react to this failure by self-organisational capabilities
inherent in the system. The ability of the swarm of HAPS to
react to the failure of one or more HAPS and to autonomously
adjust to the addition of a spare HAPS is the level of resilience
desirable for a wireless communications infrastructure in an
extreme environment. In the conceived scenario; the swarm
of HAPS forms the main network access infrastructure as
terrestrial and satellite systems are assumed unavailable.
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Fig. 3. HAPS Network showing Active and Spare Platforms
B. Modeling and Simulation background
To investigate this problem, a software model of key system
segments were developed using Matlab and simulated to
investigate the problem. Simulated HAPS models and subsys-
tems were based on standard aerodynamic and communication
link equations [21]. A parameterised model of the HAPS
was used in this work and is typical of related models in
its class e.g. the Airbus Zephyr referenced earlier. However,
due to propriety and commercial concerns, data for specific
parameters are not publicly available, leading to making
assumptions and approximations based on theoretical analysis.
The parameters in table I, describes the HAPS system commu-
nications and link budget parameters which ultimately defines
the profile of the service segment e.g. HAPS communications
payload power and link data rates. The link budget is based
on a payload power of 80 Watts, with the simulated HAPS
network supporting about 500 users spread over a large area
(typical coverage density profile for HAPS). In such thinly
populated scenarios, terrestrial networks would not be eco-
nomical and satellites may be too expensive and ineffective.
The available power is expected to be shared between the com-
munications and sensor payloads. Such payload use strategy is
relevant in emergency scenarios where first responders(fewer
in number) may request priority for sensor payloads to under-
stand the environment. As events progress, there may be need
to shift priority to communications payload as the need for
communications outweigh sensor feedback. Dynamics of this
nature are desirable and should be considered in designing
HAPS communications infrastructure.
TABLE I
HAPS SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND LINK BUDGET PARAMETERS
S/N Item Specification Justification
1 Half Power Beam Width(HPBW)
145
degrees Specific to Model
2 Normalised Signal toNoise Ratio (Eb/No) 10 dB Assumed for Link
3 EIRP
Depends
on Slant
Range
Power to support 1
subscriber at edge
of cover
4 Data Rate 100 Kbit/s Desired Link DataRate
5 HAPS TransmitterAntenna Efficiency 0.75
Assumed for
Model
6 Ground Receiver AntennaGain 1
Assumed for
Model
7 Signal Frequency 7 GHz Assumed forModel
8 System NoiseTemperature 350K Standard
C. HAPS Autonomous and Swarm Coordination Algorithm
This work considers implementing swarm of semi or fully
autonomous aerial vehicles with self-organising capabilities.
Autonomy is defined within the context of decision making,
and self governance capabilities of the HAPS, however, levels
of autonomy exist and may depend on design, functions and
specifics of the mission [22]. It is expected that aerial vehicles
of the future will be managed by fully autonomous algorithms
maintaining network connectivity, data rate and coverage as
mission objectives [14]. Autonomy in this regard can also
refer to the ability of the HAPS to make local decisions with
limited or no global knowledge and still achieve network-wide
objectives cooperatively in this case [21]. For a swarm of
HAPS with the mission of providing communications cover-
age for volcanic cloud emergency conditions, self-organisation
and swarm coordination is very crucial. A swarm intelligence
based algorithm is developed for this problem scenario and
leverages the strengths of swarm self-organising capabilities.
The participating HAPS in the swarm exchange essential
data as they explore the environment akin to foraging. By
exchanging critical data and using swarm techniques the
HAPS provide persistent and resilient coverage over the area
of interest. Figure 4, shows the flow chart for the applied
swarm algorithm developed for this work.
Fig. 4. Swarm Intelligence Algorithm Flow Chart
III. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
The simulation was run with four (4) HAPS covering an
area extending over some Indonesian islands and the Java
sea. This region was selected for the high volcanic activity
around the area and its unique location within the “Ring of
Fire” home to 75% of the world’s volcanoes and 90% of its
earthquakes [23] and associated tsunamis. The active HAPS in
the swarm as shown in figure 3 above provide fixed data rate
of 100kpbs (within rate for emergency service [24]) to about
500 users, scattered over the area of interest. One spare HAPS
is maintained in cold standby mode to be activated when an
active HAPS fails. The simulation was run for slightly above
6 hours, which is reasonable as convergence for an emergency
based solution is time sensitive. A 6 hour window provides
a reasonable constrain to test convergence and also isolate
any user density issues associated with random walk models.
The following assumptions are made in order to manage the
complexity and scope of the work.
• The HAPS swarm can activate local positioning systems
if GPS fails; valid for current technologies [25]).
• The HAPS swarm has multi-mode transmission (RF,
mmWave and Optical) for Inter-HAPS and HAPS-User
links [21], since volcanic ash can sometimes impact
RF signals, e.g. disruptions from interference to radio
transmission due to atmospheric conditions [2].
• The Swarm can activate sensor-based communications if
required.
• The HAPS network can operate as fully ad-hoc network
or part of an infrastructure based network if required [21].
A. Coverage Performance without Replacement HAPS
In the first scenario, the HAPS swarm was not equipped with
a replacement or spare HAPS. This was important to establish
a baseline and a means of validating the performance of the
coordination algorithm; the main concept of this work. It is
expected that the coordination algorithm should re-organise
the swarm and maintain or improve coverage amidst the
failure without the spare HAPS. As shown in figure 5, HAPS
1 failed at about 11.30am and its local coverage dropped to
zero. The remaining three HAPS worked to fill this gap as
shown in figure 6 as global coverage dropped from 46 users
to about 39. However, within 30 minutes, the global coverage
rose to about 49 as the HAPS self-organised to cover more
users. The swarm intelligence algorithm applied within this
scenario responded to the failure of the HAPS and maintained
recovery and positive improvement trend over the remaining
time of the simulation.
The performance of the coordination algorithm without a
replacement HAPS highlights the self-organising capacity
that is desirable in an extreme environment where human
intervention may not be possible or safe. The baseline for
measuring the algorithm has been established and will be
used to validate the next scenario, where replacement HAPS
is introduced after failure.
During the HAPS circling and relocation, the algorithm also
manages the horizontal separation of the HAPS as shown in
figure 7. This does not suggest any form of collision avoidance
but highlights another dimension to self-organisation. In figure
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Fig. 5. Local HAPS Coverage - Failure Scenario without Spare HAPS
10AM 11AM 12PM  1PM  2PM  3PM  4PM  5PM  6PM
 Time
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f 
S
u
b
s
c
r
ib
e
r
s
Global Coverage
All HAPS
Fig. 6. Global Coverage - Failure Scenario without Spare HAPS
7, HAPS 2 was used as a reference, and the horizontal distance
to each HAPS was measured all through the simulation. A
minimum horizontal separation distance of 5000m was set
for this simulation; 5500 to 9260m [26], is recommended in
some jurisdictions for manned aircraft but not established for
UAS. Achieving a neat separation profile is very critical in
HAPS aerial formations and service availability.
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Fig. 7. HAPS Horizontal Separation - Failure Scenario without Spare HAPS
B. Coverage Performance with Replacement HAPS
In this scenario, all parameters and conditions are the same
as the previous experiment except that the spare HAPS is
introduced after failure. The impact of the replacement HAPS
is noticed after failure of HAPS 1 at about 11.30am, see
figure 8. In about 1 hour the spare HAPS provided the
needed boost in the global coverage performance as coverage
improved from about 45 to 85 users as shown in figure 9.
The trajectory of improvement remained positive as the HAPS
swarm “foraged” for users within the area.
The addition of the spare HAPS clearly provided coverage im-
provement but more importantly the self-organising capability
as indicated in figures 8 & 9, which is key to autonomous
coordination especially in extreme environments. The number
of users, was constrained by the high EIRP required for the
link as defined by the link budget. Reducing the EIRP by
either using a lower Eb/No or data rate will accommodate
more users but at the detriment of service quality.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has attempted to highlight the application of
autonomous solar HAPS for providing communications area
coverage where swarm coordination is needed for emer-
gency support. Resilient aerial communications infrastructure
is needed in the absence of terrestrial or degraded satellite sys-
tems. Volcanic cloud emergencies impact aircraft but HAPS
are immune to ingesting particulates making them suitable
10AM 11AM 12PM  1PM  2PM  3PM  4PM  5PM  6PM
 Time
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f 
S
u
b
s
c
r
ib
e
r
s
Local HAPS Coverage
HAPS1
HAPS2
HAPS3
HAPS4
SPARE
Fig. 8. Local HAPS Coverage - Failure Scenario with Spare HAPS
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Fig. 9. Global Coverage - Failure Scenario with Spare HAPS
for such environments. Though there may be concerns with
solar panel obscuration by ash clouds; the low cost and
low risk potential is significant. The work has demonstrated
that self-organisation and coordination is key to meeting
emergency services demand in such extreme environments.
With the multi-day persistence capability and the concept of
dual communications and sensor payloads; HAPS may be
crucial in managing and coordinating first responders and
general emergency efforts during volcanic cloud incidences.
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Fig. 10. HAPS Horizontal Separation - Failure Scenario with Spare HAPS
A network of persistent and self-organising HAPS over the
“Ring of Fire” region can make a difference in early warning
and emergency management efforts.
Future work will consider how to improve the performance
of the solar-powered HAPS swarm for sensor and communi-
cations coverage in volcanic cloud environments. Focus will
be on practical application issues; for instance, extending
HAPS persistence for providing communications coverage by
battery powered descent under the ash clouds at night and
ascent during the day/clear skies to charge its batteries. Such
meticulous algorithmic management of energy will extend its
communications coverage capabilities and improve availabil-
ity and reliability.
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